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RELIGIOSITY, IQ, AND VIOLENCE 2	
Abstract 
Many have argued that religion reduces violent behavior within human social groups. Here we 
test intelligence as a moderator. We hypothesized that religion would have greater utility for 
regulating violent behavior among societies with relatively lower average IQs than among 
societies with relatively more cognitively gifted citizens. Two studies supported this hypothesis. 
In a longitudinal analysis from 1945 to 2010 (with up to 176 countries and 1046 observations), 
Study 1 demonstrated that declines in religiosity were associated with increases in homicide 
rates, but only in countries with relatively low average IQs. In a multiverse analysis (171 
models) using modern data (97-195 countries) and various controls, Study 2 consistently 
confirmed lower rates of religiosity were more strongly associated with higher homicide rates as 
average country-level IQ was lower. These findings raise questions about how secularization 
might differentially affect groups of different mean cognitive ability. 
 Keywords: IQ, intelligence, self-control, religion, religiosity, crime, violence  
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Declines in Religiosity Predicted Increases in Violent Crime—But Not Among Countries with 
Relatively High Average IQ  
 
Many of the world’s great global religions offer inviolable moral rules and threats of 
supernatural punishment should those rules be violated. By appealing to basic human intuitions 
and motivations such as desires to conform to a powerful authority, to belong to an organized in-
group, and to avoid punishment, religions may constrain and guide human behavior. Overall, 
religiosity predicts numerous positive life outcomes (McCullough & Carter, 2013); among these 
are moderate deterrent effects of religiosity on criminal behavior (Baier & Wright, 2001). 
Religion is associated with higher self-control, which facilitates prosocial behavior and decreases 
antisocial behavior (McCullough & Carter, 2013). However, the relationship between religiosity 
and moral behavior has been contested by scholars and the size of this effect varies substantially, 
suggesting there are moderators influencing the inconsistency of this relationship (Shariff, 2015).  
Like religion, higher intelligence and self-control (which are positively related [Boisvert, 
Stadler, Vaske, Wright & Nelson, 2013; see also Zuckerman, Silberman & Hall, 2013]) are 
associated with lower rates of antisocial behavior and crime (Boutwell et al., 2015; Moffitt, 
1993; Moffitt et al., 2011). Though the (likely multiple) reasons for these relationships remain 
obscure, higher intelligence and self-control afford citizens some unique capacities to function in 
large, complicated social environments that require sophisticated cooperation and coordination. 
Religious belief has declined among advanced industrialized societies with highly educated and 
intelligent populaces (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002; 2006), suggesting that 
religion may be less uniquely useful for people with relatively higher cognitive ability and self-
control. These individuals may be better able than others to structure their lives around abstract 
moral principles (e.g., utilitarianism [Piazza & Sousa, 2014]) and to resist immediate temptations 
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to attain longer-term rewards. Furthermore, groups comprised of such people may be better able 
to create and sustain secular institutions (e.g., democracies, rule of law) that constrain behavior 
(Kanyama, 2014), foster a sense of fairness, and maintain the trust required for cooperation and 
economic prosperity (Fukuyama, 1995). Therefore, social groups comprised of citizens with 
relatively high cognitive ability and high self-control may not benefit much from the vivid moral 
lessons of religion, whereas social groups comprised of citizens relatively lower in cognitive 
ability and self-control may benefit from the particularly powerful and intuitive interdictions and 
admonishments of many religious narratives. This would not indicate that certain groups need 
religion more than others; there are many cultural routes to regulating and enforcing norms of 
cooperation and peace. However, religiosity may be differentially advantageous for populations 
of different mean cognitive ability, and thus a decline in religiosity may have a different effect 
on these groups. 
Here, we test the hypothesis that intelligence moderates the relationship between 
religiosity and (im)moral behavior. We hypothesized that religion would have greater utility for 
regulating violent behavior among societies with lower average IQs than among societies with 
more cognitively gifted citizens. We focus on intelligence (rather than self-control) for two 
reasons: first, intelligence is associated with lower religiosity (Zuckerman et al., 2013) 
suggesting that religion may provide less service to those of high intelligence in the modern 
world; and second (and more practically), intelligence scores are widely available across many 
countries (whereas self-control data are not), allowing for cross-national analyses. Although IQ, 
especially when measured cross-nationally, is controversial, myriad analyses suggest that it has 
high construct validity, even in non-Western countries (Hunt, 2011). For example, educational 
attainment correlates strongly with both cross-national measures of IQ scores and IQ estimates 
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derived from surrounding regions (rs > .90; Lynn & Meisenberg, 2010). Like all psychometric 
constructs, IQ is not perfect and the quality of cross-national data varies. Still, analyses with 
estimates of cross-national IQs have proven fruitful and have spurred novel theorizing about 
numerous important group-level outcomes (Rindermann & Thompson, 2010). Of course, all 
human societies are populated by very intelligent people. In the present research, lower 
intelligence is merely a relative description, and it would be more precise to characterize our 
results as reflecting different degrees of high intelligence across different societies.  
We used an easily quantified form of violent behavior—homicide rates—to examine our 
hypothesis. (Other crime rates are less reliable due to cross-national differences in how they are 
defined, detected, and recorded [Neopolitan, 1996].) We predicted that lower religiosity would 
be associated with higher homicide rates among societies with relatively low average 
intelligence, but would have a weaker or non-existent relationship in societies with relatively 
high average intelligence. We tested this first using longitudinal data (Study 1), and then again 
using available modern data and various controls (Study 2). 
Study 1 
Method 
Study 1 examined the within-country association between religiosity and homicide rates 
over time (i.e., whether these two variables change in tandem over time), and whether the nature 
of this association varied based on the country’s average IQ. All countries and time points for 
which the relevant data could be obtained were included. This resulted in models that contained 
up to 1046 observations from 176 countries covering a span of 65 years. 
Religiosity. Country-level religiosity was operationalized as the percent of the population 
that practiced religion (Association of Religion Data Archives [ARDA]; Maoz & Henderson, 
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2013). Every half-decade from 1945 to 2010, the ARDA provided estimates of the average (over 
the previous five-year period) percent of the population that was affiliated with any religious 
party. To our knowledge, these are the best available country-level longitudinal data for 
religiosity. 
IQ. No large-scale country-level longitudinal data for IQ exist (e.g., data on the Flynn 
Effect include only 31 countries [Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015]), so we used three separate (but 
related) average IQ estimates by country drawn from the NIQ dataset (Becker, 2019). 
LV12GeoIQ are psychometric test data from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012) with missing nations 
supplemented by geographic means of neighboring countries. NIQ_QNWSAS (henceforth 
referred to as NIQ) are combined school assessment studies data (mainly PIRLS, PISA, and 
TIMSS) and psychometric test data from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), weighted and adjusted for 
sample size, data quality, and population composition without geo replacement (i.e., relevant 
samples were obtained from each included country). Becker describes NIQ as less in quantity but 
higher in quality than LV12GeoIQ. RIQ data (Becker & Rindermann, 2016) are calculated from 
Lynn and Vanhanen (2012) and school assessment studies (mainly PIRLS, PISA, and TIMSS) 
corrected for schooling such that populations with lower school attendance rates were adjusted 
slightly upwards (these data also include geo replacement). 
Note that all three datasets are based, at least in part, on Lynn’s data (Lynn & Vanhanen; 
2012). To our knowledge, these are the most complete and well-validated country-level IQ data 
available (Lynn & Meisenberg, 2010), but the quality of the data varies by country. We included 
the NIQ dataset precisely because it attempts to correct and adjust for differences in data quality. 
Lynn and Meisenberg (2010) thoroughly discuss the validity of Lynn’s data, but a few points are 
worth mentioning: (1) These country-level data are strongly correlated with educational 
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attainment, Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP), and various health outcomes (rs > .60); 
(2) Within-country IQ studies are highly correlated (r = .92); (3) The date the IQ studies were 
conducted (some decades ago, some more recent) does not influence the relationship between IQ 
and (more recent) educational attainment, suggesting that the year the IQ data were collected 
does not substantially reduce their predictive validity. This all supports our use of these time-
invariant (time-stable) IQ data as estimates of country-level IQ. Note also that noise in the data, 
if anything, should obscure our hypothesized pattern of results.  
Homicide and GDP. Our dependent variable, annual homicide rates by country over 
time, was drawn from Clio Infra and available beginning in the 1800s (Bierman & van Zanden, 
2014). Because of the limited availability of other relevant time-varying covariates, the only 
time-varying covariate included in Study 1 was GDP (The World Bank, 2017).1 GDP data were 
available beginning in 1960. Because GDP had a very large positive skew and the range was 
much larger than the other analysis variables (range of original GDP variable: 35.4 to 116612.9), 
GDP was square root transformed prior to analysis. Additionally, because religiosity was 
collected in half-decade intervals, homicide rates and GDP were averaged in five-year intervals 
to align with religiosity. Supplemental Table 2 also reports all correlations between all variables 
within each five-year time period.	
Time. All models also controlled for measurement year with a series of binary variables 
(less one) to account for historical changes in homicide rates. This technique is advantageous 
because it allows the model to account for natural changes over time without imposing a 
                                                
1We also explored the inclusion of income inequality as an additional control variable (The 
World Bank, 2017), but these data were extremely limited (only available beginning in 1981 and 
only for a limited number of countries) so they were ultimately rejected for Study 1. Note that 
income inequality was included in Study 2 to overcome this limitation. 
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structure (e.g., linear, quadratic) on the functional form of change. Because of data constraints 
and the need for overlapping assessments for the variables, the time-frame for Study 1 was 1945 
to 2010 for models without GDP and from 1960 to 2010 for models that controlled for GDP.  
Analytic Plan. We used fixed effects, within-country linear regressions (Allison, 2009) 
to examine (1) whether changes in religiosity were associated with simultaneous changes in 
homicide rates and (2) whether the strength of this association varied based on country-level IQ. 
These models are appropriate for panel data because the time points are nested within country 
and the estimates are adjusted for this dependence. The primary advantage of this strategy is that 
the models automatically control for time-stable variables that might vary between countries 
(geographic location, stable population and environmental characteristics). In essence, each 
country is used as its own control variable (Allison, 2009). This strategy therefore limits possible 
third factor explanatory variables to unobserved within-country factors that changed during the 
study period.  
Because of the focus on within-country variability, it is not possible to obtain main 
effects for unchanging variables (i.e., IQ; though this is tested in Study 2). For example, time-
stable variables might explain average differences in homicide rates between countries, but they 
do not explain why a particular country might fluctuate in homicide rates over time. Using these 
models, we were able to examine whether country-level homicide rates systematically increased 
as a country decreased in religiosity. 
Although it is not possible to obtain main effects for time-stable variables, it is possible to 
examine interactions between time-stable (in our case, IQ) and time-varying (i.e., religiosity) 
variables. As such, we were able to use these models to examine the critical question of whether 
the association between religiosity and homicide rates varied for countries with different average 
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IQ levels. All fixed effects models were estimated with robust standard errors. The general 
structure of the fixed effects models used in the present study is (based on Allison, 2009): 
Homicideit = µt + β1Religiostyit + β2IQXReligiosityit + β3GDPit + ∑βzMeasurementYearit + αi + εit 
 
Where… 
 
• Homicideit = Homicide rate for country i at time t 
• µt = Intercept for time t 
• Religiostyit = Religiosity score for country i at time t 
• IQXReligiosityit = A product term between IQ and Religiosity (an interaction) for country 
i at time t 
• β3GDPit = GDP for country i at time t 
• ∑βzMeasurementYearit = Sum of the effect of all dummy coded time variables for 
country i at time t 
• αi = the combined effect of unobserved time-invariant variables for country i 
• εit = error term for country i at time t 
 
No alternate models were tested that are not reported here (with the exception of pre-peer 
review models that included a lower quality measure of country-level IQ but that demonstrated 
very similar patterns of results as those reported here). All analyses for Study 1 were conducted 
in Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015), and all data and code will be made publicly available upon 
acceptance for publication. 
Results 
 First, we examined the extent to which change over time in religiosity was, on average, 
associated with change over time in homicide rates, before and after adding GDP as a covariate 
(See Table 1, Models 1 and 3). All models controlled for measurement year as described above, 
but these variables were excluded from Table 1 for space. Results showed that, on average, 
religiosity was not significantly associated with homicide rates over time, with or without 
controlling for GDP. 
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Next, we added interactions between religiosity and each of the three time-invariant IQ 
variables in models with and without GDP (each product term examined in its own model; See 
Table 1, Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 4a, 4b, and 4c). The interaction was significant at p<.005 in four of 
the six models, p<.05, in five of the six models, and p<.091 in all six models.2 This interaction 
suggests that the nature of the association between religiosity and homicide rates over time 
varied based on the country’s average IQ. 
 
  
                                                2	Note, we also cross-checked models using GDP and homicide estimates from the same 
individual years for which the five-year average religiosity estimates were reported. In these 
analyses, all six interactions were statistically significant (ps<.022). These results are reported in 
Supplemental Table 3. 
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Table 1 
Within-Country Associations between Changes in Religiosity and Simultaneous Changes in 
Homicide Rates by Average Country IQ 
  Coef 95% CI Robust SE p 
Model 1 (N=176, obs.=1046)      
Religion 0.04 -0.05 0.14 0.05 .350 
Model 2a (N=136, obs.=922)      
Religion -2.82 -5.21 -0.43 1.21 .021 
Religion X NIQ 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 .018 
Model 2b (N=173, obs.=1038)      
Religion -3.43 -5.61 -1.24 1.11 .002 
Religion X LV12GeoIQ 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 .002 
Model 2c (N=173, obs.=1038)      
Religion -2.98 -4.96 -0.99 1.01 .004 
Religion X RIQ 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 .003 
Model 3 (N=164, obs.=864)      
Religion -0.07 -0.20 0.05 0.06 .255 
GDP -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 .010 
Model 4a (N=130, obs.=762)      
Religion -2.06 -4.45 0.32 1.20 .089 
Religion X NIQ 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 .090 
GDP -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.01 .073 
Model 4b (N=163, obs.=861)      
Religion -2.88 -4.59 -1.18 0.87 .001 
Religion X LV12GeoIQ 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 .001 
GDP -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.02 .091 
Model 4c (N=163, obs.=861)      
Religion -2.46 -4.02 -0.91 0.79 .002 
Religion X RIQ 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 .002 
GDP -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.02 .090 
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Notes. Fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors used for all models. 
N=Number of unique countries included in the analysis. Obs=Observation count. Homicide rates 
and GDP averaged in five-year intervals to align with religiosity. All models also controlled for 
historical changes by including a series of dummy-coded time variables representing each of the 
measurement years (less one).  
 
 
Probing of the significant interactions suggested that increases in religiosity were 
associated with simultaneous decreases in homicide rates for countries with lower average IQs 
only. For example, for countries with average IQs approximately one standard deviation below 
the overall mean, declines in religiosity were associated with increases in homicide rates (Βs 
from -0.46 to -0.33; see Table 2). However, the positive values (i.e., > 0) for the interaction terms 
indicated that the slope representing the association between religiosity and homicide rates 
systematically became more positive as average IQs were higher. For example, in countries with 
average IQs approximately one standard deviation above the mean, the association between 
religiosity and homicide was near-zero or positive (Βs from 0.10 to 0.15; see Table 2).3  
 
  
                                                
3 Note that when people describe an IQ score of 100 as average, this average was based on the 
average IQ in the United Kingdom, which is above average relative to other countries. 
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Table 2 
 
Posthoc Probing of Religiosity by IQ Interactions in Models Predicting Homicide Rates 
  Coef 95% CI p 
Models with Religiosity x NIQ 0.02 0.00 0.05 .090 
Religiosity estimate for ~ +1 SD IQ country 0.10 -0.05 0.26 .179 
Religiosity estimate for ~ average IQ country -0.11 -0.25 0.03 .114 
Religiosity estimate for ~ -1 SD IQ country -0.33 -0.70 0.05 .086 
     
Models with Religiosity x LV12GEOIQ 0.03 0.01 0.05 .001 
Religiosity estimate for ~ +1 SD IQ country 0.15 0.06 0.23 .001 
Religiosity estimate for ~ average IQ country -0.15 -0.30 -0.01 .034 
Religiosity estimate for ~ -1 SD IQ country -0.46 -0.76 -0.15 .004 
     
Models with Religiosity x RIQ 0.03 0.01 0.04 .002 
Religiosity estimate for ~ +1 SD IQ country 0.12 0.04 0.20 .004 
Religiosity estimate for ~ average IQ country -0.14 -0.28 0.00 .046 
Religiosity estimate for ~ -1 SD IQ country -0.40 -0.68 -0.11 .007 
Notes. Fixed effects linear regressions used for all models. Homicide rates and GDP averaged in 
five-year intervals to align with religiosity. All models also controlled for temporal changes by 
including a series of dummy-coded time variables representing each of the measurement years 
(less one) and GDP. Estimated religiosity coefficients for different average IQ levels obtained by 
re-centering IQ variable. “-1 SD IQ” was approximately 1 standard deviation below the sample 
mean (~80); “average IQ” was around the sample mean (~90); and “+1 SD IQ” was 
approximately 1 standard deviation above the sample mean (~100). Because the precise values 
for the means and SDs varied for the three measures of IQ, we probed the interaction with even 
values that were roughly representative of the means and SDs. The precise means and SDs for 
the analytic sample were: NIQ: M = 86.51, SD = 13.56; LV12GEOIQ: M = 87.54, SD = 11.01; 
RIQ: M = 86.82, SD = 11.90.  
 
Study 2 
Study 1 demonstrated that declines in religiosity from 1945 to 2010 predicted concurrent 
increases in homicide rates among countries with relatively low average IQs only. Study 2 
sought to confirm these results with available modern data, which allowed for the inclusion of 
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additional control variables and tests with multiple operationalizations of religiosity to confirm 
that the results are not limited to ARDA estimates and to eliminate concerns that the present 
results are influenced by the Flynn Effect (because all data are time-stable). 
Method 
Study 2 examined the interaction between country-level IQ and religiosity on homicide 
rates. All countries for which the relevant data could be obtained were included. Given that there 
are no objective best measures of religiosity and IQ nor an objective best list of relevant control 
variables, we conducted a multiverse analysis using three operationalizations of religiosity, three 
operationalizations of IQ, all possible combinations of four control variables, and additional 
interactions between those control variables and each operationalization of religiosity. 
Multiverse analysis reports all (or at least many) of the conceivable statistical models to 
eliminate researcher degrees of freedom (Steegen, Tuerlinkx, Gelman, & Vanpaemel, 2016). 
Multiverse analysis is preferred to preregistrations of specific analysis plans because 
preregistrations allow researchers to specify the one statistical model that they think is most 
likely to produce the hypothesized result. In a multiverse, researchers analyze every single model 
they could have chosen and report the results for all models, thus eliminating entirely (or nearly 
entirely) researchers’ ability to exert control over the results with variable and model selection. If 
most or all models in a multiverse demonstrate a meaningful effect size for the hypothesized 
effect, this is much stronger evidence that the effect is real than demonstrating the effect once in 
one preregistered model. 
 Religiosity. Religiosity was operationalized as the percent of the population affiliated 
with any religion (Pew Research Center, 2012), the percent of the population that practices 
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religion (ARDA; Maoz & Henderson, 2013), and the percent of the population that reports that 
religion is an important part of their daily life (Gallup, 2009). 
IQ. The same three average IQ estimates by country from Study 1 were again used in 
Study 2: LV12GeoIQ, NIQ, and RIQ.4 
Homicide. Per capita homicide rates were drawn from the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC; most recent available year of data was used [majority from 2012]). 
To our knowledge, this source provides the best available estimates for homicide rates, and so no 
other operationalizations of homicide rates were included in the multiverse analysis. Please see 
the Supplement for secondary analyses using a different operationalization of violence (tourism 
safety scores), which demonstrate very similar patterns as those observed for homicide rates. 
Controls. In all possible combinations, we controlled for various other factors generally 
regarded to be related to homicide rates: GDP and the Gini index of income inequality (2015 
CIA World Factbook; latest available estimates were used where 2015 estimates were not 
available), population density (The World Bank, 2015), and educational attainment (secondary 
education completion rate; The World Bank, 2019).5 At the request of a reviewer, we analyzed 
additional models (in models with all controls) also controlling for the interactions between each 
operationalization of religiosity and GDP, each operationalization of religiosity and income 
inequality, and each operationalization of religiosity and educational attainment (independently, 
                                                
4 In a second round of revisions, a reviewer suggested we cross-check these analyses with school 
assessment study data only (i.e., without Lynn’s data), so we reran our main analyses (first 
without controls then with all four controls) with these data instead (SAS from Becker [2019]). 
The interaction effect was very similar (ns = 71-98 countries, semipartial rs = .08-.33), though 
with the very limited number of countries, the interaction was not always statistically significant. 
5Data for 2014 were used because they were the most complete; closest available estimates were 
used where 2014 estimates were not available (and only if within three years of 2014). 
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so only one additional interaction was included at a time). The Supplement contains a table of 
source information for all variables included in both Studies 1 and 2 (Supplemental Table 1). 
Multiverse. This combination of variables and planned analyses produced 171 possible 
statistical models with up to 195 countries. All variables were z-transformed prior to analysis, 
except for GDP, which was square root transformed as in Study 1.6,7 Data were analyzed first in 
SPSS and then cross-checked in R. All data and code will be made publicly available upon 
acceptance for publication. 
Results 
 Correlations. As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 3), higher homicide rates 
were associated with lower IQ, GDP, and educational attainment. Higher homicide rates were 
unrelated to population density and either unrelated (ARDA and Pew) or positively associated 
(Gallup) with religiosity. Higher IQ was associated with higher GDP, population density, and 
educational attainment, and lower religiosity and income inequality. Higher religiosity was 
negatively associated with GDP and educational attainment, positively associated with income 
inequality, and unrelated to population density.  
                                                
6 Reviewers requested the square root transformation instead of z-transformation for GDP. This 
was honored in all models except in models including the interactions between religiosity and 
GDP. For these models, we z-transformed GDP for purposes of computing the interaction term. 
7 Please see the Supplement for an initial (pre-peer review) multiverse, which included parasite 
stress and average annual temperature and did not include educational attainment and the 
additional interactions between control variables and religiosity. At the request of a reviewer, 
parasite stress and temperature were not included in the present multiverse, and although these 
variables were positively correlated with higher homicide rates (rs ≈.33) and negatively 
correlated with IQ (rs≈-.68), in the full model, they accounted for virtually zero variance in 
homicide rates (semipartial rs <.01). 
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Table 3.            
Correlations between homicide rates, all IQ variables, all religiosity variables, and all control variables included in Study 2. 
    Homicide                 
   Rate 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
NIQ (2) r -0.421          
 p <.001          
 n 146          
LV12GeoIQ r -0.378 0.856         
(3) p <.001 <.001         
 n 195 147         
RIQ (4) r -0.375 0.870 0.978        
 p <.001 <.001 <.001        
 n 195 147 199        
ARDA r 0.082 -0.477 -0.536 -0.528       
Religiosity (5) p 0.259 <.001 <.001 <.001       
 n 191 140 185 185       
Pew r 0.101 -0.500 -0.534 -0.528 0.870      
Religiosity (6) p 0.135 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001      
 n 219 147 197 197 191      
Gallup r 0.244 -0.698 -0.727 -0.750 0.715 0.730     
Religiosity (7) p 0.003 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001     
 n 146 125 144 144 141 146     
GDP (8) r -0.168 0.700 0.700 0.712 -0.333 -0.310 -0.598    
 p .014 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001    
 n 212 146 196 196 190 222 144    
Gini (9) r 0.509 -0.468 -0.507 -0.536 0.340 0.184 0.505 -0.368   
 p <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.031 <.001 <.001   
 n 138 116 138 138 135 138 123 138   
Population r -0.102 0.189 0.199 0.180 -0.041 -0.106 -0.103 0.227 0.088  
Density (10) p 0.144 0.023 0.006 0.013 0.579 0.125 0.220 <.001 0.303  
 n 205 143 192 192 189 211 144 212 138  
Educational r -0.248 0.585 0.668 0.667 -0.352 -0.303 -0.595 0.693 -0.316 0.123 
Attainment (11) p 0.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.114 
 n 169 126 162 162 160 169 128 170 122 168 
Shaded indicates significant negative correlation; outlined indicates significant positive correlation; unaccented indicates no significant 
relationship. 
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Multiverse. In separate regressions, homicide rates were regressed on one of the three 
operationalizations of religiosity, one of the three operationalizations of IQ, and the relevant 
interaction (for nine possible interaction terms), independently and with every possible 
combination of the four control variables, excluding listwise. This produced a total of 144 
possible models. For each of the nine full models (with all four controls), we tested three 
additional models controlling for the interactions between the relevant operationalization of 
religiosity and (1) GDP, (2) income inequality, or (3) educational attainment, which produced 27 
additional models. Thus, we tested 171 models in total for the multiverse. 
We used semipartial rs (the proportion of the variance in homicide rates uniquely 
explained by the interaction) as estimates of the interaction effect size; p-values <.001 were 
coded as .00099. Across all possible models (see Figure 1), the effect sizes for the interaction 
between religiosity and IQ ranged from small/medium, semipartial r = .14, to medium/large, 
semipartial r = .46 (Cohen, 1992), with a medium average effect size (M semipartial r = .30, SD 
= .08). The interaction was statistically significant at p < .001 in 64.9% of models, p < .010 in 
88.9% of models, p < .050 in 97.7% of models, and p < .078 in 100% of models. Thus, the 
multiverse provided very strong support for the hypothesized interaction.8,9 
                                                
8 Homicide and ARDA and Gallup religiosity were skewed, so analyses were re-run omitting 
countries >3 SDs above the homicide mean (Honduras, Venezuela, Belize) and countries >3 SDs 
below the religiosity mean (Czech Republic, Estonia, South Korea, Japan). This did not affect 
the effect size or statistical significance of the interaction with or without controls. 
9 To ensure the results were not influenced by a lack of representation of certain combinations of 
religiosity and IQ (e.g., high religiosity and high IQ or low religiosity and low IQ), we performed 
median splits on religiosity and IQ and cross-checked the interactions in 2 x 2 ANOVAs. All 
nine interactions (three IQ measures by three religiosity measures) were statistically significant, 
ps < .003, with medium to large effect sizes, ηp2s = .064-.156. In the low IQ country group, high 
religiosity countries consistently had lower homicide rates than low religiosity countries, ps < 
.001. In the high IQ country group, there were no differences between high and low religiosity 
countries on homicide rates, ps > .127 (nor were the differences in the same direction). 
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Figure 1. Multiverse analysis frequency histograms of semipartial rs and p-values for the interactions between IQ and religiosity.
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Sample models. To decide which models to expand upon for purposes of graphing the 
interaction, we checked the average semipartial rs for each of the nine interaction terms, and 
selected the smallest (LV12GeoIQ x Gallup religiosity), largest (NIQ x ARDA religiosity), and 
the one closest to the overall mean (RIQ x Pew religiosity). We expand upon these three 
interactions without any controls and then with all four controls (for six models total). Note that 
none of the additional included interactions (between each of the three operationalizations of 
religiosity with [1] GDP, [2] income inequality, and [3] educational attainment within each of the 
27 additional models) were even consistently in the same direction across models and only one 
of the 27 tested interactions was statistically significant (between income inequality and ARDA 
religiosity in the models with NIQ, semipartial r = -.160, p = .027). Thus, we do not test or 
discuss these additional interactions further. As can be seen in Table 4, higher IQ was a 
significant predictor of lower homicide rates in four of the six models, religiosity was a 
significant predictor of lower homicide rates in five of the six models, and their interaction was 
significant in all six models. 
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Table 4.        
Homicide rates regressed on IQ, religiosity, their interaction, and controls in Study 2.  
  F R2 b t p 95% CI Semipartial r 
Sample models for LV12Geo IQ x Gallup religiosity (small estimate) 
Model (n = 144) 7.89 0.13   <.001   
IQ (LV12Geo)   -0.41 -3.45 0.001 -.67, -.18 -0.270 
Religiosity (Gallup)   -0.20 -1.39 0.166 -.51, .09 -0.109 
IQ x Religiosity      0.24 2.41 0.017 .05, .50 0.188 
Model (n = 111) 6.68 0.31   <.001   
IQ (LV12Geo)   -0.20 -1.07 0.287 -.61, .18 -0.087 
Religiosity (Gallup)   -0.48 -2.70 0.008 -.90, -.14 -0.221 
IQ x Religiosity    0.35 2.76 0.007 .11, .67 0.225 
GDP   0.10 0.56 0.578 -.56, 1.00 0.046 
Income Inequality   0.49 4.74 <.001 .31, .77 0.387 
Population Density   -0.08 -0.86 0.390 -.58, .23 -0.070 
Education     -0.29 -1.84 0.068 -.66, .02 -0.151 
Sample models for NIQ x ARDA religiosity (large estimate) 
Model (n = 140) 26.20 0.37   <.001   
IQ (NIQ)   -0.67 -8.08 <.001 -.90, -.55 -0.552 
Religiosity (ARDA)   -0.84 -6.20 <.001 -1.16, -.60 -0.423 
IQ x Religiosity      0.74 6.06 <.001 .52, 1.03 0.413 
Model (n = 101) 13.64 0.51   <.001   
IQ (NIQ)   -0.49 -3.66 <.001 -.84, -.25 -0.266 
Religiosity (ARDA)   -1.07 -6.33 <.001 -1.49, -.78 -0.461 
IQ x Religiosity    0.89 5.92 <.001 .62, 1.24 0.431 
GDP   0.11 0.87 0.388 -.37, .94 0.063 
Income Inequality   0.37 4.21 <.001 .22, .62 0.306 
Population Density   -0.01 -0.11 0.916 -.45, .41 -0.008 
Education     -0.26 -2.38 0.019 -.67, -.06 -0.174 
Sample models for RIQ x Pew religiosity (middle estimate) 
Model (n = 195) 19.27 0.23   <.001   
IQ (RIQ)   -0.53 -6.84 <.001 -.68, -.37 -0.433 
Religiosity (Pew)   -0.68 -4.69 <.001 -.91, -.37 -0.297 
IQ x Religiosity      0.58 4.46 <0.001 .24, .62 0.283 
Model (n = 122) 11.01 0.4   <.001   
IQ (RIQ)   -0.22 -1.33 0.187 -.60, .12 -0.096 
Religiosity (Pew)   -0.90 -4.71 <.001 -1.25, -.51 -0.341 
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IQ x Religiosity    0.82 4.71 <.001 .34, .84 0.340 
GDP   0.02 0.10 0.924 -.64, .70 0.007 
Income Inequality   0.39 4.27 <.001 .22, .61 0.309 
Population Density   -0.04 -0.52 0.605 -.45, .26 -0.038 
Education     -0.17 -1.29 0.198 -.46, .10 -0.094 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, simple slopes one standard deviation above and below the 
overall mean of IQ indicated that in countries with relatively high average IQ (IQ ≈ 95-98), there 
were small to non-existent relationships between higher religiosity and lower homicide rates 
(LV12Geo IQ x Gallup [b = -.10], t = -0.76, p = .452; NIQ x ARDA [b = -.16], t = -1.71, p = 
.092; RIQ x Pew [b = -.22], t = -2.45 p = .016), but in countries with lower average IQ (IQ ≈ 70-
73), higher religiosity was associated strongly with lower homicide rates (LV12Geo IQ x Gallup 
[b = -.89], t = -2.92, p = .004; NIQ x ARDA [b = -2.06], t = -6.36, p < .001; RIQ x Pew [b = -
1.44], t = -4.82, p < .001).
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Figure 2. Interactions between IQ and religiosity on homicide rates with all four controls in Study 2. 
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Galton’s Problem and Spatial Autocorrelation. Galton’s Problem is an issue with 
cross-cultural data (and perhaps statistical inference more generally) regarding drawing statistical 
inferences from non-independent data. Countries are treated as independent observations, yet 
neighboring societies (e.g., the United States and Canada) or otherwise historically related 
societies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) share numerous traits and in some 
cases are near duplicates of each other, which can bias results in unpredictable ways. For 
example, if we are oversampling one particular type of culture (because one culture spreads 
across numerous countries), that particular culture can have a heavy influence on the overall 
results. Lines between countries are at least somewhat arbitrary in terms of dividing up distinct 
populations. 
After consulting with several Galton’s Problem experts, we sought to deal with this issue 
in three ways. First, following Hruschka and Henrich (2013), we reran the nine full models 
controlling for dummy coded world regions. Second, we tested the interactions within world 
regions and within countries that share the same majority religion to assess whether the 
interaction is particularly strong or weak in particular world regions or among countries of 
particular majority religions. Third, we hired a statistical expert to rerun our analyses controlling 
also for spatial autocorrelation between countries. Thorough results of these additional analyses 
are reported in the Supplement. 
Controlling for world region. Controlling for world regions in the nine full models (now 
with nine control variables each and 97 to 122 countries each) did have a small influence on the 
size of the interaction effects, but generally did not affect the interpretation of the findings. Six of 
nine models continued to show significant IQ by religiosity interactions with small to medium 
effect sizes (ARDA models’ semipartial rs = .190-234, ps<.006; Pew models’ semipartial rs = 
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.209-.258, ps<.003). The three Gallup models no longer reached statistical significance, but 
maintained generally small effects in the same direction (semipartial rs = .08-.10, ps<.260).  
Testing within world region. We collapsed the seven world regions into four world 
regions (Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and Africa, South Asia and East Asia Pacific, and 
North and Latin America and the Caribbean) in an effort to get large enough sample sizes to test 
the interactions within regions. However, even doing so, the samples were very small across 
models (18 to 67 countries each), and so we caution against interpreting any of these specific 
interaction terms in isolation. Within each of the four world regions, we analyzed each of the 
nine interaction terms in the base models (without controls) and then again controlling for 
income inequality only (we were already severely underpowered to test models with additional 
controls, but income inequality did stand out as the most important control in the full 
multiverse). Because of the small sample sizes, the interactions were rarely statistically 
significant in any of the world regions. We arbitrarily decided that a semipartial r of .07 or 
higher for the IQ by religiosity interaction term would be a “consistent effect,” that is, consistent 
with the IQ by religiosity interactions found in the multiverse. Of the 18 models tested within 
each world region, 9 were consistent in Europe and Central Asia, 10 were consistent in South 
Asia and East Asia Pacific, 12 were consistent in North and Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and 12 were consistent in the Middle East and Africa. Thus, the effect did not appear to be 
particularly absent in any world region, reducing the likelihood that the effects are not (at least 
somewhat) generalizable globally. 
Testing within majority religion. We repeated these analyses within Christian majority 
countries (71 to 124 countries) and Muslim majority countries (23 to 45 countries). Again, we 
caution against interpreting any specific interaction, especially for Muslim majority countries, 
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because of the small sample sizes. Here, there at least appeared to be a difference. Of the 18 
models tested within each religion, 17 were consistent in Christian majority countries, whereas 
only 3 were consistent in Muslim majority countries—potentially due to reduced variance in 
religiosity in Muslim majority countries, which often feature uniformly high levels of reported 
religiosity. Nevertheless, the difference led us to create two additional dummy variables, whether 
a country was majority Christian or not and whether a country was majority Muslim or not, and 
to test whether either of these dummy variables moderated the nine IQ by religiosity interactions 
(in the base models, without controls). None of the 18 three-way interactions were statistically 
significant, and so we do not interpret this possible difference between Christian majority 
countries and Muslim majority countries. However, whereas we are quite certain the pattern is 
real in Christian majority countries, we are less certain about whether it holds in Muslim 
majority countries. A table in the Supplement titled Galton’s Problem Analyses (Supplemental 
Table 5) reports the semipartial rs and p-values for the IQ by religiosity interactions within each 
of these new models (9 models controlling for region, 18 models within each of the four world 
regions and within each of the two religions, for 117 additional models total). 
Accounting for spatial autocorrelation. Last, we hired a statistical consultant to account 
for spatial autocorrelation between countries (correlation due to spatial proximity). He ran 
Bayesian multilevel regressions including a Gaussian process (McElreath, 2018) to account for 
spatial autocorrelation between countries in 18 models: the 9 main models and the 9 models with 
the four main controls. The interaction was statistically significant at pMCMC < .001 in 1 model, 
pMCMC < .010 in 6 models, pMCMC < .050 in 8 models, pMCMC < .100 in 13 models, and 
pMCMC < .228 in all 18 models. He concluded that accounting for spatial autocorrelation 
weakened but did not abolish the effect. The full report, R code, and output for these analyses are 
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available with the Supplement. Researchers who use his R code should cite him (rather than the 
present paper) as described in the Supplement. 
Galton’s Problem Conclusions. Though none of our efforts for dealing with Galton’s 
Problem may rule out concerns related to non-independence of country-level comparisons 
completely, they do provide evidence that the effect likely cannot be attributed to one particular 
world region (though, as noted above, they may be more true of Christianity than Islam). Despite 
this, that controlling for region weakens the effect suggests the possibility that the strength of the 
interaction varies at least somewhat by subregion. Future research might conduct multiple 
within-country or within-region analyses to identify countries or regions that do not display the 
interaction reported here. 
Data Auditor. As a final step to testing the robustness of the reported interaction, we 
hired an external adversarial data analyst to audit and cross-check our results. She cross-checked 
two additional 171 model multiverses, one with a different standardization approach, and one 
with median split dummy coded indicators of each operationalization of religiosity and IQ. The 
results largely confirmed those reported here. The full auditor report is available in the 
Supplement. Researchers who use her multiverse R code should cite her (rather than the present 
paper) as described in the Supplement. 
General Discussion 
Whether religion serves a social function in suppressing antisocial behavior has been 
discussed for well over 2000 years, and psychological research has recently begun empirically to 
investigate this idea in earnest (e.g. Purzycki et al., 2016; Shariff, 2015; see Norenzayan et al. 
2016 for a review). Here we introduce a possible moderator for the contested relationship 
between religiosity and moral behavior—intelligence. Our results indicated that higher 
RELIGIOSITY, IQ, AND VIOLENCE 28	
religiosity was largely unrelated to homicide rates in societies with relatively high average 
intelligence, whereas religiosity was a significant predictor of reduced homicide rates in societies 
with relatively low average intelligence. Study 1 supported this by examining changes over the 
past 65 years. Study 2 confirmed this pattern by comparing the majority of countries in the world 
at the same time in cross-sectional analyses with various controls. Thus the results supported our 
hypothesis that religiosity would have greater violence-deterring utility among populations with 
relatively lower mean cognitive ability than among more cognitively advantaged populations. 
Though we scrutinized the reported interaction in several hundred ways and found quite 
consistent and robust support, our results should be interpreted with caution. All three of our 
main variables of interest (religion, intelligence, and morality) are multifaceted and challenging 
to measure, and even more challenging to compare across cultures. First, for example, the 
present results might apply more to some religions than others, and we imagine the effect could 
vary in countries experiencing religious conflict. So, whereas the interaction may be true in the 
aggregate, it almost certainly is not true in every type of cultural system. Despite finding 
supportive evidence for the interaction in each of the four world regions we tested, that 
controlling for world region weakened the interaction effect suggests that the interaction might 
vary in strength and significance in different regions. Moreover, whereas we found evidence for 
the effect in the present and over the past 65 years, the nature of the effect could change in the 
future as secularization likely continues to increase. Future research should investigate possible 
variation and potential reasons for it. Second, though we reported the interaction between 
intelligence and religiosity on homicide rates (mainly, because homicide rates are the most 
reliable cross-national measure of violence), our theorizing focused more on violence or 
antisocial behavior generally. In the Supplement, we tested the effect with an alternate measure 
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of violence (based largely on citizens’ reports of perceived violence in their own country) and 
found a similar pattern, but future work should explore whether the interaction emerges for other 
types of violent crime and antisocial behavior (should reliable sources of cross-national violence 
be identified). 
Last, though country-level IQ appears to be an important predictive variable, it is 
controversial because IQ varies substantially within countries, and because such differences may 
be caused (at least in part) by differences in schooling and other cultural differences (e.g., 
nutrition). We controlled for at least one sort of education (secondary education completion rate) 
and the RIQ analyses adjusted for schooling, but we would not be surprised if a thorough index 
of all educational differences (in both quality and quantity) explained at least a large portion of 
the present effect (Rindermann & Ceci, 2009). However, we are not sure whether this would be a 
confound (the effect is driven by education, not intelligence) or a mechanism (higher intelligence 
leads to better educational systems and participation in those systems). Moreover, given the links 
between higher self-control with higher intelligence, higher religiosity, and lower antisocial 
behavior, we suspect self-control may be an important mediating variable or perhaps even the 
crucial variable that explains the present results. IQ might also be a proxy for a combination of 
other unmeasured variables that might better explain the pattern observed in the present analyses. 
We hope future work will investigate these possibilities. 
Future research should also test whether the relationship between religiosity and 
intelligence on violent (or other antisocial) behavior operates on a group-level only, or whether 
similar patterns would be observed on an individual-differences level and/or from experimental 
manipulations of religiosity (Na et al., 2010). If the present results operate on a group-level only, 
this might suggest that it is not intelligence per se that regulates violent behavior even in the 
RELIGIOSITY, IQ, AND VIOLENCE 30	
absence of religion, but rather that having a highly intelligent society contributes to highly 
functional group-level institutions and norms that help regulate behavior. In the Supplement, we 
reported exploratory analyses with two potential mechanisms, Rule of Law and Democracy, but 
the interaction was robust to these controls as well. Identifying the most viable mechanism(s) 
should be a crucial priority for future research.  
Admittedly, though we hypothesized the observed pattern of results, we do not know 
exactly what it is about intelligence or religion that is associated with lower violent behavior. 
The mechanisms for intelligence and for religiosity might be similar (e.g., both might increase 
self-control) or they might be quite different (e.g., each might lead to different effective attitudes, 
norms, or institutions), but both appear to have some advantages for regulating violent behavior 
on a group-level. The present analyses were not intended to reach final conclusions, but rather to 
shine light on a potentially important and consequential relationship among these variables. We 
regard our research as a first step and welcome further input from other researchers. 
The present work might inspire a bit of cautious reflection on the prescriptive values of 
WEIRD societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Educated societies might promote 
secularization without considering potentially disproportionately negative consequences for more 
cognitively disadvantaged groups. Some potential suppressors of violence (e.g., rule of law, 
trustworthy secular institutions, widespread concerns for fairness) may be more effectively 
implemented by populations with relatively high cognitive capacity (Kanyama, 2014), at least at 
the present moment. The benefits of religion may not be confined to homicide and so there may 
be sweeping, multifaceted ways in which religion reduces violent, antisocial behavior, and 
particularly among societies with relatively low average cognitive ability. 
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We suspect that similar patterns might emerge for numerous cultural narratives. The 
prescriptive values of highly educated groups (such as secularism, but also libertarianism, 
criminal justice reform, and unrestricted sociosexuality, among others) may work for groups that 
are highly cognitively sophisticated and self-controlled, but they may be injurious to groups with 
lower self-control and cognitive ability. Highly educated societies with global esteem have more 
influence over global trends, and so the prescriptive values promulgated by these groups are 
likely to influence others who may not share their other cognitive characteristics. Perhaps then  
highly educated and intelligent groups should be humble about promoting the unique and 
relatively novel values that thrive among them and perhaps should be cautious about mocking 
certain cultural narratives and norms that are perceived as having little value in their own 
society.  
One-size-fits-all social prescriptions to complicated social problems may lack important 
nuance. And indeed some cultural institutions (like religion, but also others such as monogamous 
marriage norms [see Henrich, Boyd, & Richerson, 2012]) that are denigrated as outmoded 
among high-IQ populations, may still serve valuable functions among other groups around the 
world.     
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